Singapore Stock Market News

Time to read more about Ecowise. Was quite disappointed with their investor relations since their website only provided 2 years worth of financial statements (which is the same for sgx announcement website) and one of the statements is actually truncated off. Looks like I have to rely on bits and pieces of information.

Let’s take a look at a few figures first. FY04 and FY05 have net losses. We’ll just see the latest three years to take note of the trend in the metrics.

-----------------------------------FY05-----------FY06-----------FY07
COGS (% to revenue)-------65.7%----------46.7%----------43.9%
Gross margin------------------34.3%----------53.3%----------56.1%
Net margin-------------------(-11.2%)---------18.9%----------22.5%
Financial leverage-------------1.7----------------1.6-------------1.7
Asset turnover-----------------0.7----------------1.0-------------1.0
ROE---------------------------(-13.4%)---------31.3%----------35.9%

I saw a brief summary of their results in FY04 and FY05, both are losing money. Without any annual report, I’ve no idea why they are losing money. But let’s focus on the FY06 and FY07 where I have more information.



Here’s what I think:

1. Cost to goods sold has dropped tremendously from 65.7% to 43.9%. The management sited lower disposal cost contributed to this lower cost, thereby increasing their gross margins from 34.3% in FY05 to 56.1% in FY07. I wasn’t really satisfied with this kind of gloss over statement, but there’s not much I can do to find out more, given the sparse information from their website. Still, gross margin this high is pretty admirable. I wonder if there’s anything to compare with.

2. I realized that they had lots of ‘corporate activities’ like cash dividends, right shares and warrant issues. Really messed up the total number of shares outstanding, to the extent that I had problem deciding how many shares they had in a financial year. Looks like they needed lots of capital for something…I don’t know what. My guess is for their investment in a new crusher or their cogeneration plant…but I really don’t know since I can no longer find documents from sgx announcements website.

One interesting thing is that Ecowise had an acquisition on a company named Watertech Pte Ltd, which the founder later bought back (after citing disagreement for common ground and performance indicators). Ecowise made a net gain of $80,000. How come the discussion isn’t made properly before acquisition? So eager to get the company that there is not time to discuss? It’s fortunately that the founder of Watertech wishes to buy back at a higher price. Funny.

3. ROE increase seems to be driven by net margins improvements. At 22.5% in FY07, I think it’s a pretty good business. History is too short for me to comment much too.

4. Based on their financial leverage metric, it seems that Ecowise’s debt is rather stable. I calculated their Debts to Free cash flow for FY06 and FY07, it turns out to be 1.68 and 1.71 respectively. I hope their cashflow is enough to pay for their debts. Actually, the bulk of their FY07’s current liabilities is due to their trade and other payables (75.2% of total current liabilities), while the bulk of their long term liabilities comes from finance lease (78.2%). I don’t think there’s a problem paying off their liabilities at all, looking at their balance sheet.

5. Their revenue can be segmented into different business area, namely collection, processing, solutions and corporate. Let’s take a look:

** margin is based on profit before income tax as a ratio to revenues **

-----------------------collection------processing-------solutions-------corporate
Margins (FY06)-------13.4%-----------14.6%----------13.6%-----------198%
Margins (FY07)------10.8%------------16.9%----------974%------------71.5%

** Due to eliminations, I can’t find the % of each business segment’s contribution to the total revenue **



If I’m not wrong, there are 3 new streams of revenue. I’m not sure if these are to be subsumed under the above 4 business areas. There is absolutely no mention of any plans by ecowise in their financial statements nor their website. I had to piece the information below myself, so I might be wrong.

a) Carbon credit sale – their wholly owned subsidiary signs ERPA with Kansai Electric Power Co Inc in Japan, for the sale of up to 95,000 certified emission reduction certificates, equivalent to 95,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere which would have been emitted otherwise. The ERPA will be for carbon credits generated from early 2008 until end of 2012.

Since ecowise is the first registered company to do such sale, I think it shows their expertise in this area. I admit, half the time, I’m not sure what they are talking about. I only know that Ecowise plans to leverage their expertise as a Clean development mechanism (CDM) project developer, whatever that means.

b) Their new cogeneration plant that can generate electricity and heat from renewable biomass like wood and horticulture waste. This new plant, if I’m not wrong, can be a new revenue stream as their can sell either the technology or the electricity generated. Okay, I’m not really sure, and I can’t find any information on it. But one thing for sure is that ecowise is using their own generated steam (for heating) and electricity for its production and process, hence reducing the use of diesel and grid electricity, hence their cost should go down even more.

c) Ecowise forms a JV with Holcim, one of the world’s leading cement and aggregates suppliers, to purpose of which is to maintain and operate an industrial materials recycling and processing plant to recycle and process used copper slag in Singapore. Joint research and development facility set up will also seek new alternative sources of fuels and raw materials towards sustainable developments in construction and building materials. I got to admit, this is their most exciting venture as the prospects could potentially be good. It is stated explicitly by the management that this is JV will be the cornerstone of their continued growth in the coming years. They are working together to create an eco-concrete for construction companies, amidst the high construction activity in Singapore. Processed copper slag can be mixed into ready-mix concrete as an alternative to sand. Sounds exciting.

Though I can’t find the exact contribution to the total revenue based on the 4 business segments, I can approximate it. It’s takes up a huge chunk of the total revenue for sure, with solutions and corporate forming a very small percentage. I’m wondering why in page 9 of their FY07 report that the eliminations is so high. Contract got cancelled? What happened? Even in FY06 too. No mentions ofthe high eliminations in both FY06 and FY07 by management. This is a red flag to me.



A few important questions:

1) Ecowise’s core business of collection of used copper slags and general waste for shipyards and fabrication yards in Singapore. It is stated that the collection fees are charged based on per trip basis or tonnage. Where do those ships come from? Will the ships be affected by a highly possible decline in demands over at US?

2) For their processing business, it is the recycling of used copper slag used for surface treatment by shipyards and fabrication yards. So again, will the possible decline in demands from US affect the shipyards/fabrication plant business, and in turn affect Ecowise’s revenue?

3) Is Singapore ready for the green evolution? Could this be a concept stock that won’t take off because others are not ready?



Just found out a bit more in addition to the above when I did a google search on Ecowise. Managed to dig out a summary of the IPO prospectus (from wall straits - wonderful site!) for Ecowise when it got listed in 2002. Here are the extra stuff I managed to dig out:

1. Directors have a profit sharing programe based on the profit before tax (PBT) per year.

PBT over $2.5m up to $3.5m:

* Sunny Ong Keng Hua: 5%
* Lee Thiam Seng: 3%
* Oh Kian Chye: 2%

PBT over $3.5m:

* Sunny Ong Keng Hua: 7.5%
* Lee Thiam Seng: 4.5%
* Oh Kian Chye: 3%

If it reaches $4m in a given year, total compensation for the three directors will be about $600,000. I think this will really motivate the directors to think in line with the shareholders as they have a direct stake in the company. I'm just wondering why their investor relations in their website is so bad as it reflects badly on the company for not wanting to disclose more to prospective investors like me.

2. Stated in their IPO prospectus is their business Model :

Future Plans Include:

* Expand its processing and recycling facilities (okay, done)
* Intensify its marketing efforts to promote the recycled products generated from waste management solutions (since their processed copper slag is doing well, i suppose they did that)
* Feasibility study to produce charcoal on a large scale (not that I know of)
* Licensing of waste management solutions (yes, it's part of their business, a small part)

Business Strategies:

* To provide waste management solutions
* To keep abreast of current recycling technologies and environmental practices
* To expand customer base
* To attract, train and retain experienced professionals
* To achieve growth through acquisitions, joint ventures, or strategic alliances

3. The following are the major competitors they cited:

* JPL Industries Pte Ltd (collection & recycling of used copper slag)
* Meng Guan Landscape & Construction Pte Ltd (recycling horticultural waste)
* Kiat Lee Landscape and Building Pte Ltd (recycling horticultural waste)
* Gold Green Corp Pte Ltd (recycling horticultural waste)

I doubt they are listed, though it means nothing except that it's harder for investors to gauge how strong their competitors are without access to their statements. I wonder what's ecowise competitive advantage over their competitors besides visibility due to their listed status.

4. Risk Factors :

* Operate in a competitive environment and if it is unable to compete favorably, results of operations will suffer
* Subject to regulatory conditions and license renewal
* Dependent on certain major customers
* Dependent on the local ship repair and marine industry
* Decline in the price and demand for recycled copper slag may erode revenue
* Increase in disposal fees charged by NEA
* Dependence on network of service providers
* Loss of key personnel will have an adverse impact on business
* May require additional funding for future growth
* No assurance that future plans will be commercially successful
* Exposed to credit risk and defaults in payment
* Dependence on the Singapore economy
* May not always have adequate insurance coverage
* Contractual obligations to provide clearance and disposal services at fixed rates under the term contracts could result in operating losses
* Failure to comply with the conditions in term contracts
* May be subject to fluctuations in foreign exchange rate which could lead to forex losses
* Subject to intellectual property risks
* Risks relating to the new shares

I think it's good to know the risk factors involved in the business to construct a convincing bear case. As I pointed out, there is a real dependence on the local shipping/marine industry for their core business of processing copper slag. A lot of external factors will determine the outlook for ecowise. Basically it's a concept company and hence risky business.

5. The following are their major customers, at least for the FY2002:

Keppel Group: 12.1% of FY2002 revenue
SembCorp Group: 44.0%
ST Marine Ltd: 12.0%
Toh Kim Bock CE Contractor Pte Ltd: 7.4%

Closely linked to the local shipping/marine industry, as they pointed out in their risk section. It might have changed a lot presently, but back in FY002, the local shipping/marine customers makes up like 75% of their revenue. That's quite unacceptable to me, knowing that shipping is cyclical. I do hope that presently in FY07/08, their revenue income is more diversified.



Summary:

A severely lacking Investor relations in Ecowise’s website AND the sparse information given by the management in the statements PLUS the lack of a clear plan makes this little company a hard nut to crack.

Based on funny empirical formula again, I found out that the value of Ecowise is at 0.225. There is no way to valuate this company properly given the lack of information. I can be sure that the price will definitely go above the current closing price of 0.180 though. How undervalued this is, I’m not too sure. Given that my estimation of 0.225 is correct, 0.180 represents a 20% margin of safety, certainly not good enough for me. Call me greedy, I’ll like it more if I see 0.115 (representing a margin of 50%).

How many traits of a great investor do you have? A great article to see if you have the guts and mettle to be a good investor. I guess investing is equally relevant to life too. See how many you strike :)

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Reading this won't make you great

Mark Sellers, founder of a Chicago-based hedge fund, argues that the best investors are born with particular psychological traits that others can never learn

By TEH HOOI LING
SENIOR CORRESPONDENT

WHAT makes someone a great investor? It's something you have to be born with, said Mark Sellers, founder and managing member of Sellers Capital LLC, a long/short equity hedge fund based in Chicago.

Apparently, it's not about your IQ, the education you've had, the books you've read, or the experience you've accumulated. 'If it's experience, then all the great money managers would have their best years in their 60s and 70s and 80s, and we know that's not true,' he said in a speech to a class of Harvard MBA students.

Intelligence and learning are obviously necessary too, and are sources of competitive advantage for an investor, but there are structural assets some possess that cannot be copied or learnt by others. 'They have to do with psychology and psychology is hard wired into your brain. It's part of you. You can't do much to change it even if you read a lot of books on the subject,' said Mr Sellers.

He said that there are seven traits great investors share that are true sources of advantage because they cannot be learned. You are either born with them or you aren't.

The seven traits are:

One, the ability to buy stocks while others are panicking, and the ability to sell at a time when other investors are euphoric. 'Everyone thinks they can do this, but then when October 19, 1987, comes around and the market is crashing all around you, almost no one has the stomach to buy,' Mr Sellers said.

'When the year 1999 comes around and the market is going up almost every day, you can't bring yourself to sell, because if you do, you may fall behind your peers.

'The vast majority of the people who manage money have MBAs and high IQs and have read a lot of books. By late 1999, all these people knew with great certainty that stocks were overvalued, and yet they couldn't bring themselves to take money off the table because of the 'institutional imperative', as Buffett calls it.'

Two, the great investor has to be obsessive about playing the game and wanting to win. 'These people don't just enjoy investing; they live it. They wake up in the morning and the first thing they think about, while they're still half asleep, is a stock they have been researching, or one of the stocks they are thinking about selling, or what the greatest risk to their portfolio is and how they're going to neutralise that risk.

'They often have a hard time with personal relationships because, though they may truly enjoy other people, they don't always give them much time. Their head is always in the clouds, dreaming about stocks. Unfortunately, you can't learn to be obsessive about something. You either are, or you aren't. And if you aren't, you can't be the next Bruce Berkowitz.'

(Berkowitz was a managing director of Smith Barney and set up his fund Fairholme Capital Management in 1999. Since inception, Fairholme Fund has returned 18.7 per cent annually on average.)

The third trait of a great investor is the willingness to learn from past mistakes. 'The thing that is so hard for people and what sets some investors apart is an intense desire to learn from their own mistakes so they can avoid repeating them. Most people would much rather just move on and ignore the dumb things they've done in the past.

'I believe the term for this is 'repression'. But if you ignore mistakes without fully analysing them, you will undoubtedly make a similar mistake later in your career. And in fact, even if you do analyse them it's tough to avoid repeating the same mistakes.'

A fourth trait is an inherent sense of risk based on common sense. 'Most people know the story of Long Term Capital Management, where a team of 60 or 70 PhDs with sophisticated risk models failed to realise what, in retrospect, seemed obvious: they were dramatically overleveraged. They never stepped back and said to themselves, 'Hey, even though the computer says this is OK, does it really make sense in real life?'

'The ability to do this is not as prevalent among human beings as you might think. I believe the greatest risk control is common sense, but people fall into the habit of sleeping well at night because the computer says they should. They ignore common sense, a mistake I see repeated over and over in the investment world.'

Five, great investors have confidence in their own convictions and stick with them, even when facing criticism. 'Buffett never get into the dotcom mania, though he was being criticised publicly for ignoring technology stocks. He stuck to his guns when everyone else was abandoning the value investing ship and Barron's was publishing a picture of him on the cover with the headline 'What's Wrong, Warren?'. Of course, it worked out brilliantly for him and made Barron's look like a perfect contrary indicator.'

Mr Sellers said that he is amazed at how little conviction most investors have in the stocks they buy. 'Instead of putting 20 per cent of their portfolio into a stock, as the Kelly Formula might say to do, they'll put 2 per cent into it. Mathematically, using the Kelly Formula, it can be shown that a 2 per cent position is the equivalent of betting on a stock which has only a 51 per cent chance of going up, and a 49 per cent chance of going down. Why would you waste your time even making that bet?'

The Kelly Formula arose from the work of John Kelly at AT&T's Bell Labs in 1956. His original formulas dealt with the signal noise of long-distance telephone transmission. It was then adapted to calculate the optimal amount to bet on something in order to maximise the growth of one's money over the long term.

Six, it is important to have both sides of your brain working, not just the left side - the side that's good at maths and organisation. 'In business school, I met a lot of people who were incredibly smart. But those who were majoring in finance couldn't write worth a damn and had a hard time coming up with inventive ways to look at a problem,' said Mr Sellers.

'I was a little shocked at this. I later learned that some really smart people have only one side of their brains working, and that is enough to do very well in the world but not enough to be an entrepreneurial investor who thinks differently from the masses.

'On the other hand, if the right side of your brain is dominant, you probably loathe math and therefore you don't often find these people in the world of finance to begin with.'

So finance people tend to be very left-brain oriented - and Mr Sellers said that that is a problem. A great investor needs to have both sides turned on, he said. 'As an investor, you need to perform calculations and have a logical investment thesis. This is your left brain working. But you also need to be able to do things such as judging a management team from subtle cues they give off.

'You need to be able to step back and take a big picture view of certain situations rather than analysing them to death. You need to have a sense of humour and humility and common sense. And most important, I believe you need to be a good writer.'

He cited Warren Buffett as one of the best writers ever in the business world. 'It's not a coincidence that he's also one of the best investors of all time. If you can't write clearly, it is my opinion that you don't think very clearly,' Mr Sellers said.

And finally the most important, and rarest, trait of all: the ability to live through volatility without changing your investment thought process.

This, said Mr Sellers, is almost impossible for most people to do; when the chips are down they have a terrible time not selling their stocks at a loss. They have a really hard time getting themselves to average down or to put any money into stocks at all when the market is going down.

'People don't like short-term pain even if it would result in better long-term results, he said. Very few investors can handle the volatility required for high portfolio returns. They equate short-term volatility with risk.

'This is irrational; risk means that if you are wrong about a bet you make, you lose money. A swing up or down over a relatively short time period is not a loss and therefore not risk, unless you are prone to panicking at the bottom and locking in the loss.

'But most people just can't see it that way; their brains won't let them. Their panic instinct steps in and shuts down the normal brain function.'

Since quite a lot of people are interested in Synear, especially the recent fall from heaven, and wondering if it’s a good bargain now, I thought I’ll be interesting to find out a little more about Synear. Synear doesn’t have a lot of history since it only IPO in SGX on August, 2006. I’m thankful for its investor friendly statements too – means that I don’t have to spend a lot of time reading fine print and such.

--------------------------------2005--------------2006----------------2007--------
COGS (% to revenue)------68.6%-------------66.4%--------------67.8%------
Gross margin----------------31.4%------------33.6%--------------32.2%------
Net margin------------------16.3%-------------21.8%--------------21.5%------
Financial leverage-----------3.53---------------1.35-----------------1.16--------
Asset turnover---------------2.28---------------1.12-----------------0.70--------
ROE-------------------------131.3%------------33.0%--------------17.4%-----

There are a few things I noticed about Synear just by coming up with this table of comparison between the financial years:

1. Synear managed to control their costs, keeping it near 66 to 68% of revenue. As can be seen from their gross margin, it’s also a stable figure around the vicinity of 32%. It’s only depressing when one looks at the 4th quarter results.

-----------------------------------4QFY06---------------------4QFY07------------
COGS (% to revenue)----------64.6%-------------------------72.4%-------------
Gross margin ------------------35.4%-------------------------27.6%-------------
Net margin----------------------21.8%-------------------------10.7%-------------

While 4QFY06’s COGS is more or less in line with the full year FY06, it’s a different story for FY07. We can see that there is a huge difference between 4QFY07 gross margin of 27.6% and full year FY07 gross margin of 32.2%.

As mentioned by the management, the price of the Group’s main raw materials (pork, flour and packaging materials) have increased by an average of approximately 13% in 2007 as compared to that of last year. If we increase 4QFY06’s 64.6% COGS to revenue by 13%, we’ll get 73.0% (64.6 x 1.13 = 73.0), which is quite the figure for 4QFY07. Management isn’t joking when they say it’s 13% increment in raw materials!

2. Gross margin is kept nearly constant for the full year results, but again looking at quarterly results, the higher cost of goods sold reduced the gross margin from 35.4% in 4QFY06 to 27.6% in 4QFY07. Management did say that they raised their average selling price for their products by about 8% in April 2007 (2Q FY07).

Let’s review what companies can do to raise their revenue:

a) Raise the price of the products (which they did, by 8%)
b) Sell more products
c) Sell a new range of products
d) Growth by acquisition

a) They did raise the price of their products by 8%. However, this is still less than the price increment for their raw materials. Unless they can fill the gap by selling more, it’s hard to raise prices anymore since the products they are selling isn’t staple. I mean consumers can totally do without it if the price is too much for them to pay. That’s the bad thing about this food business – there is no discernible economic moat and too many similar products and substitutes. I don’t think price increment will go down well with consumers, unless their products are really different from their competitors (then they can charge a higher price for it).

b) They did sell more products.

From FY06 to FY07,

Savoury dumplings products---- sales revenue increase by 21.3%
Glutinous sweet dumpling products ----- sales revenue increase by 16%
Other quick freeze products ---- sales revenue increase by 18.9%

(% to the total sales)
------------------------------FY05---------------FY06---------------FY07------------
Savoury dumplings------44.8%--------------45.0%---------------45.9%----------
Glutinous dumplings----38.5%--------------35.8%---------------34.9%---------
Other quick freeze-------16.6%--------------19.1%---------------19.1%---------

Take note that part of the sales increase is due to the increase in price and not the volume of sales. This increase must at least be partially attributed to the increase in the number of distributor from 515 to 604 in FY07.

We can see from the table above what is the trend that consumers like for their product mix. Their savoury dumpling products is getting more sales year on year, while their glutinous dumpling products isn’t that popular. In fact, their quick freeze products seem to be taking in more share while their glutinous dumpling products dropped. This is totally what I expected since I like savoury rather than sweet products, haha 

c) Management said that having a premium range of products increased their sales (page 12 from 4QFY07 result). I believe they are talking about their new pan-fried dumpling series and their premium “Shoudatianxia” series of savoury and sweet dumpling, which commanded higher gross profit margins. This shows that Synear do sell new range of products so that customers will always find something fresh in their product range. The good thing is that these new product range draws a higher margin, but whether people buy it is another thing (which I can’t tell).

Their FY06 annual report stated that Synear had acquired land to build a new product development centre in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. This new product development centre will work on improving existing products, improve production efficiency and product safety, as well as launch new and innovative products.

d) No plans for acquisition mentioned by Synear.

3) ROE drop is interesting. I’m waiting for the ROE to stabilize itself, maybe to around 10 to 15% into the future. We can see that the ROE drops because the financial leverage of Synear actually decline a lot in the past 3 years. They have less short term debts and reduced their long term debts to zero, which may or may not be a good thing.

Another factor that contributed to the drop in ROE is due to their decreasing asset turnover. There is tremendous spending in property, plant and equipment (PPE) and a big chunk of their total assets is in cash and cash equivalents. The increase in PPE (and land rights) is due to Synear’s plan for new plants in Chengdu city, Huzhou city and Guangzhou city, amounting to a total of RMB 383.4 million, offset by amortization and depreciation charge of about RMB 20.2 million.

I think ROE will definitely drop more as they had plans to relocate their production facilities out of the city area to suburban areas in Zhengzhou city. It’ll take about 4 years to construct, with the first phase of construction comprising cold storage warehouses to be completed within a year from Feb 08. The new facilities, termed “Synear Industrial District” will amount to about RMB 1,200 million. Basically, as long as the facilities can really boost up their revenues, I don’t see a problem with the drop in ROE due to low asset turnover. It’ll take some years (at least 4) to realize the potential of all these new plants.

Let’s take a tally for the $$ needed for future expansion

(a) Synear Industrial District – RMB 1,200 million
(b) Acquring land and building cold storage warehouse – RMB 310 million
(c) New production facilities in Shenyang city – RMB 180 million

Total amount = RMB 1,690 million
Net proceeds from placement of new shares in April 07 = RMB 1,140 million
Short fall = RMB 550 million

In RMB (million)
-----------------------------------FY05---------------FY06---------------FY07------------
Net cash from operation-----397------------------290-----------------514-------------
Cash balance--------------------86-------------------822----------------1,153------------
% op cash to sales------------26.7%---------------15.6%-------------23.2%------------

It does look like Synear have enough cash from its operations to fund the short fall of RMB 550 million, perhaps with a little more long term borrowings from banks. Since they have no long term debts, perhaps borrowing is a better way to finance the expansion plants. I could be wrong, as I’m no expert in financing. As Synear mentioned, they will use the earnings generated from the Group’s operations and/or external borrowings.

Summary:

Actually I’m pretty satisfied with Synear statements. I’m a little worried about their escalating cost (as shown in their latest 4Q results) and how they plan to overcome this cost. I’m also a little skeptical about how they can keep growing their revenue. Maybe their brand is more than what I think is worth, but it remains to be seen since their history is so short. Very satisfied with their debts and cash flow too.

Using my very quick method of getting an approximate value for Synear, I get around 1.14. (pls dun ask me how I get this value, as I said it’s very approximate and not tested fully, just empirically). I'll do a more detailed one maybe tonight.

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I tried to work out some value for synear but realised that I can't. The reasons mainly due to the fact that the free cash flow for synear is not consistent as they are spending a lot on capex. Being unfamiliar with the industry and the business, the estimate I have is going to be very wide. Another thing is that they are in this expansion and growth phase, making the valuation hard too as their metrics are not stable (and I have only 3 years of data).

I'll stick to my rough estimate of 1.14 then. Applying 50% error margin, I think a good chance to buy is around 0.570. PE (earnings based on FY07, price as $0.665) is 9.4. PE based on my buy price of 0.57 is 8.0. PE based on my estimate of 1.14 is 16.0. Should be a real bargain if that price is reached. Do your due diligence as ultimately it's not my money!

Today, I saw a very wonderful website that inspires me. For a change, this isn't about investment or the stock market, but rather, it's a website that talks about freelancers - people like me!


Naturally I'm interested to see if other freelancers are facing the same problems as me :) I came upon this website as I was looking for a new wallpaper for my desktop. It's been quite a while since I last changed it, so I thought I'll go around looking for one. That's when I came across this website with its beautiful (and motivational) wallpaper. It's from this website called the Freelance Switch.

That little picture attached on this blog post is the wallpaper on my desktop. Motivational huh? :)

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I'll carry on my 'sneak preview' on Synear tmr. I'm away for the whole weekend, hence I'm unable to work on it. Been real busy lately.